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Introduction
In early 1977, the main fuqahā1 (legal experts in  fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence) of the recently organized
Sahrawi refugee camps met in  the  dāira of Sbetīn2 to discuss whether the population of the settlement
should practice the taqsīr al-ṣalāh (the shortening/abridgement of prayers). This theological discussion was
animated by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (the Polisario Front).
After the 1975 Moroccan Green March and the Moroccan and Mauritanian invasion of the territory of the
former Spanish colony of the Sahara, tens of thousands of Sahrawis had fled to the open fields to escape the
violence, ending up in Algerian territory.3 The Polisario Front, which was formed in 1973 and which led the
anticolonial struggle against Spain until 1975, was suddenly responsible for managing an array of refugee
camps inhabited by some 40,000 to 100,000 people amidst a total war (San Martin 2010, 111).
The practice of  taqsīr (shortened prayer) changes the number of  rakaʿāt (movements) performed at each
ṣalāh (prayer). Islam typically prescribes five ṣalāt every day, in a practice called tatuīl (full prayer). The
first ṣalāh,  al-ṣubḥ, is composed of two rakaʿāt; the second, al-ẓuhur, of four; the third, al-‘aṣar, also of
four; the fourth, al-magrib, of three; and the fifth, al-‘isha, of four. In certain circumstances, the number of
rakaʿāt in the ṣalāt of al-ẓuhur, al-‘aṣar and al-‘isha may be reduced to two. Both the Koran (4: 101) and
the collections of  hadith refer to this practice. With this said, the matter is approached differently by the
* This article is part of a project that has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) 
under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant agreement No. 716467)
1 (Plural for faquīh) Throughout the article I will follow the America Library Association-Library of
Congress transliteration system.
2 Sbetīn is a site located in one of the dry river beds near the Algerian city of Tindouf. In 1975, the 
camps were organized by and for refugees fleeing from Western Sahara. Although the interviewees used 
the word “dāira”, in the documents of 1976 the basic unit of settlement in the sahrawi refugee camps was 
the “mukhayamat” (camps), for example: Congresos populares especiales (La opinión de las masas, 13 May 
1976) special number, p. 6; also was used the concept frīq (Pazzanita 2006: 159); the political organization in 
dauāir (sing. dāira) was not seated in that times, this camp being established prior to the subsequent 
establishment of the current refugee camps: Rabuni, Smara, Bojador, Aaiun and Dajla. (I will use the 
Spanish transliterations of the names of the refugee camps as this is what is currently being used by the 
camps authorities.)
3 On 6 November 1975, before the International Court of Justice ruled over the Sahara and because 
of the risk of the Spanish government’s holding a self-determination referendum, Morocco declared the 
Green March. More than 300,000 people, including Moroccan soldiers and civilians, entered the territory of
the former colony of the Spanish Sahara, supported by Mauritanian troops in the south of the territory. 
Franco was dying in Spain at the time, so they decided to sign the Tripartite Agreements on November 14. 
These agreements established the tripartite management of the territory until February 1976, at which point 
Spain would withdraw to carry out the referendum of self-determination directed by Morocco.
different schools (maḏāhib) of Sunni Islam, among which Maleki  maḏhab is hegemonic in the Western
Saharan region. This practice is related to situations of lower safety or travel and was part of a larger series
of  decisions  governing  rituals  in  refugee  camps,  such  as  fasting  during  Ramadan,  the  construction  of
mosques, and the duration of certain ṣalāt. The solutions to these problems have been multiple and have
depended on theological debates within the camps on the political, social and geopolitical context in which
they have been carried out for more than forty years of exile.
The  abovementioned  assembly  established the  taqsīr as  the  hegemonic  way of  practicing  prayer.  This
decision implied the unification of religious practices for the entire population of the refugee camps –
mainly women, children and the elderly. The decision resulted from the application, to the religious field, of
markaziyah dimuqratiah (democratic centralism), the guiding principle of political life in the camps during
the first years of their formation. This form of organization seems to have been the pivotal point from
which the Polisario Front applied its revolutionary program, which sought to create an egalitarian nation
beyond the tribal  and statutory differences that  defined the precolonial  social  organization of  Ṭrāb al-
bīḍān.4 Whereas during the 1970s and 1980s this unifying practice had been purposefully observed, this
uniformity began to crumble in the 1990s. The performance of the taqsīr implied a liminal5 state of danger,
instability and uncertainty that is difficult to maintain, which led to resistance. Despite its growing disuse,
to this day there are people, especially the elderly, who still  practice shortened prayer, associating this
practice with their loyalty to the state and the Sahrawi nation.
In this article, I  analyse the historical evolution of this practice and the polemics in which it  has been
located. From this perspective, I aim to provide arguments that contribute to the academic debate on the
management  of  the  nation and the state  in  the  Sahrawi  context.  It  has come to  my attention  that  the
religious dimension of this particular case is seldom addressed. I believe that attention to this aspect can
shed light on the ways in which liberation projects can manage the expectations of refugee populations by
framing the performative practices of revolution. In the case of the Sahrawi, a phenomenon that began in a
time of “exodus” remains alive in the refugee camps to this day. In this study, which covers a period of
more than forty years, I attempt to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms of nation-building, their
evolution, and their adaptation.
Materials and Methods
Taking a collaborative approach (Rappaport 2008), this research was carried out jointly with the sociologist
Mohammed Ali Laman from the Department of Oral Memory Collection of the Ministry of Culture, 6 the
4 The term Ṭrāb al-bīḍān refers to the space between the river Draa in Morocco and the Senegal 
river from north to south, going deep into the Tindouf region and the Malian north-western Azawad. It is 
inhabited by a population largely constituted by nomads, mainly Hassanophones, whose social structure is 
based on a dynamic hierarchy built around certain qabā'il (tribes) with religious and warrior social statuses,
dependent on which are tributary qabā'il and other dependent groups. More commonly, these populations 
are associated with the term bīḍān (white men), which indicates a socially elite status, and the region is by 
extension associated with the term Ṭrāb al-bīḍān (the land of white men) (Lopez 2003, 131–151).
5 This concept was introduced by Arnold Van Gennep (1960) and developed by Turner (1969, 
1974). It refers to the state of exception created during change. In the beginning it was applied to rites of 
passage, but it was later also used to analyse revolutions. For a reflection on this concept in the Western 
Saharan context, see Wilson and McConnell (2015).
6 From this author: Laman, Mohammed Ali (2009) al-ṣaḥrāʼ algharbīa: mukhtamiʿah ua 
zaqāfa. Rabuni: Infosolidarité.
researcher Lahsen Selki  Sidi  Buna,  and the anthropologist  Juan Carlos Gimeno from the Autonomous
University of Madrid, who put us in contact and guided the investigation in its initial stages. Professor
Laman, being a great connoisseur of Sahrawi folklore and society, provided essential help with finding
participants and pointing out processes of great interest to the research. Lahsen Selki not only provided
indispensable  support  with translations,  but  he also was a highly engaging interlocutor without whose
support  I  could not  have understood the cultural  meaning  of  many of the situations  presented  to  me.
Although ethnographically informed, my narrative is influenced by my background as a historian, giving
importance to the chronology in order to understand some aspects of the research.
We agreed on working on the plural legal practices in the Sahrawi society. In order to do so, we arranged a
set of interviews with some elder qāḍī living in the refugee camps. In the course of subsequent visits to the
refugee camps, we enlarged the number of interviewees we met.7 The research on which this article is
based draws on a series of in-depth interviews with a group of 45 people involved in the provision of
justice from the late colonial period to the present. The average age of the participants, among which 76%
were men and 24% women, was 71 years old. The individuals resided in the six Sahrawi refugee camps
around Tindouf and had different origins with regard to both - their places of birth and their tribal and
family affiliations. In addition, I was given access to archives such as those at the Ministry of Information
and the Ministry of Justice and Religious Affairs of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).
Each interview was prepared jointly, with Mohammed Ali doing the first round of questions in Hassaniya
and myself later asking questions in Spanish, which were translated into Hassaniya by Lahsen Selki. The
interviews were conducted through a biographical approach, with special  attention to the interviewees’
genealogy and education; activities related to the exercise of their functions; their culture and religion; and
their involvement in the construction of the camps. Also, we arranged supplementary meetings with some
of them in order to discuss the conclusions we were drawing and to deepen some arguments.8
During this time, I lived with Lahsen Selki’s family in the cluster of homes comprising his wife’s house, his
sister-in-law’s house, and their aunt’s house in the Smara camp. This allowed me to appreciate the social
depth of certain practices and issues that emerged in the interviews,  taqsīr being one of them. The first
interviewees indicated their participation in the abovementioned Sbetīn meeting, which took place in the
initial stages of the refugee camps’ organization and addressed the applicability of the taqsīr practice. At
first sight, this appeared to be an anecdotal report unrelated to my investigation, which was focused on
legal pluralism, but with time this topic sparked my curiosity. The discussions that took place after the
interviews were especially revealing. During translation and daily work, Lahsen’s friends and family would
sometimes engage in heated debate. It soon become clear to me that although the shortened prayer was no
longer performed by many refugees, the motivations behind it and the possibilities it opened up were of
interest to my hosts. It is also true that an anthropologist is not a mere observer but a producer of social
facts  as  well  (Freire  2017,  150).  During  my  fieldwork  visits,  these  lively  discussions  took  place
innumerable times, indicating that this practice, although no longer explicitly commonly used, nonetheless
remains implicitly relevant in a significant and controversial way. As this issue serendipitously emerged
7 These fieldwork visits where during Octobrer-December 2017; April-May 2018 and October 2018.
8 Meetings in Ausserd and Rabuni October 2018.
from my research on another topic – which is always a possibility when one assumes an anthropological
perspective (Rivoal and Salazar 2013) – I decided to take an advantage of it.
Tribes, Revolution and the Secular
Sahrawi society in refugee camps is often taken as an example of what a revolutionary society should be
like: an egalitarian society in which tribal practices have given way to a process of identification with the
nation,  where  Islamic  religiosity  is  an  almost  invisible,  individual,  private  and  benevolent  practice
(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014). This discourse was mobilized by the Polisario Front in a context of exile and
dependence  on  international  aid;  it  is  worth  pointing  out,  however,  that  its  success  also  depends  on
expectations of what Sahrawi society should look like. This study challenges this understanding of the
Sahrawi  refugee  camps.  Here,  the  management  of  religious  practices  will  be  considered  part  of  a
revolutionary  process  involving  practices  that  combine  the  Marxist-Leninist  tradition  with  those  of
hassanophone society.
I  accept,  provincializing  Western  modernity  (Salvatore  2007),  the  existence  of  multiple  modernities
(Eisenstand 2000) that  allow for the definition of  a sphere of  action framed within the nation.  In  this
analysis, I will try to connect the agency of the liberation movement to the theological phenomenon. The
Polisario Front’s program has been described as “secular”, but this should be understood as a broad term
covering many situations and as potentially including religious management (Asad 2003). On the other
hand, religious discourse should be “desacralized” in order to lay bare the historical and social contexts in
which  it  is  performed  (Ennaji  2013).  As  Itzea  Goikolea  (forthcoming)  points  out,  this  desacralization
implies not that religious phenomena are irrelevant to society in general, and to Arabo-Islamic societies in
particular, but quite the opposite: “it is so important that it tarnishes everything because many relations,
dynamics and institutions are gestated in a religious framework”.9
Religiosity in Sahrawi society is an under-studied topic. Fiddian Qasmiyeh (2011) highlights the strategic
dimension of the use of religious frameworks by the Polisario Front, mobilizing notions of “secularism”
and “religious tolerance”. In this regard, she points out that this strategy can explain the view that there are
no mosques in the camps. In addition, religion is not expected to be present in such a revolutionary place.
The only reference to the debate on taqsīr in refugee camps that I have been able to locate places it in the
dangerous situation of dealing with Islam: “Although nomadic Islam is not a sophisticated theology, it is an
Islam that is simple,  rocky, without ceremonies or  clergy,  without mosques or madrasas, practical  and
adapted to the environment; the Polisario’s intrusion into an especially sensitive land was more than many
people could bear” (García 2001, 241–242). In this regard, the discourse on the refugee camps always tries
to emphasize the secularism of its management or the “good Islam” practiced by its inhabitants. Avoiding
discussion of religiosity places it on suspicious terrain.
The  relationship between the  qabā'il,10 the  nation and the  state  is  an important  topic  in  anthropology.
Gellner’s already classic works on Muslim society (1981) and on nations and nationalism (1983) implied
9 For more on how religious knowledge is embodied and disputed in the wider region, see (Brenner 
2001 and Ware III 2014).
10 Henceforth, I prefer to use the concept qabīlah (pl. qabā'il) when referring to the tribal structures 
of the region, seeking to avoid the symbolic and pejorative burden of the concept of a “tribe”.
the  possibilities  of  group  solidarity  with  regard  to  the  ability  of  nomadic  populations  to  transform
themselves into nations. The accretion processes that took place within the Saharan qabā'il were carefully
studied by the anthropologist Pierre Bonte, whose works on segmental organization in the southern region
of the Sahara are of great importance (1979 and 1982). In these studies, Bonte revealed different strategic
processes in which segments were fused. Historically, the qabīlah was the dominant identity space in the
region  (Caratini  1989;  Lopez  2003).  This  was  the  case  in  the  work  carried  out  by  the  Spanish
anthropologist Caro Baroja (1954) in the mid-1950s. Currently, however, spaces of sovereignty are defined
in terms of nationhood (Bonte 2017).
More recently, the anthropologist Konstantina Isidoros has argued that a nomadic society’s own dynamic of
accretion can give rise endogenously to a national framework (Isidoros 2018).11 She has proposed that the
refugee camps around Tindouf function in a deep sense as a great friq, or nomadic encampment. This vision
receives a more nuanced treatment in the analysis proposed by the anthropologist Alice Wilson (2016), who
describes  the  processes  of  social  change  produced  in  the  refugee  camps  by  invoking  the  image  of  a
palimpsest. Just as the meaning of the faintly legible remains on certain reused parchments is preserved on
the page, in Wilson’s analysis the revolution carried out in the camps by the Polisario Front-SADR was
transcribed  over  qabā'il  society  in  a  way  that  made  it  possible,  following  the  palimpsest  analogy,  to
decipher the practices of the qabā'il that lie beneath national practices.
Historian Pablo San Martin (2010), also working with historical documentation, reveals how the liberation
movements of  the  1970s  strongly influenced the  young leaders of  the Polisario  Front.  In  addition,  he
reveals the influence of these movements on the anticolonial mobilization of the past decades, as well as
the adoption of practices present in the bīḍān repertory of contention (Tarrow 2011: 39). As the political
scientist Jacob Mundy (2007) reminds us, the war is what precipitated the hurried application of a national
program to a population who had relocated there for what they thought would be a few months.
Parallel to other liberation movements of the time, the Polisario Front was born within a strong anti-tribal
discourse. The movement led a revolutionary process that aimed to create a more egalitarian society and
nation state (Gimeno 2007). The anthropologist Sophie Caratini, who did her doctoral fieldwork in the mid-
1970s and who went to the refugee camps in the 1990s, points out the effects of the revolution on the
structure of Sahrawi society (2003). Although she also describes important continuities, she identifies the
important role of state action when it came to reorganizing Sahrawi society. This, however, is not at odds
with the (pre)existence of a tribal, Muslim society.
From Spanish Colonialism to the Refugee Camps
Included in the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories subject to decolonization as of 1963,12 in the mid-
1960s  Spanish  Sahara  was  the  last  remaining  colony in  the  Western  Saharan  region.  Facing  growing
international pressure to decolonize the territory after the Ifni-Sahara War (1957–1958), Franco’s Spain
intensified its colonization of the territory. The region was declared a metropolitan province, border control
was  strengthened,  and  a  series  of  investments  were  carried  out  to  improve  the  colony’s  economic
performance.  Accompanying these policies, in a context of geopolitical and economic change resulting
11 For a comparative perspective, see (Bonte, Conte and Dresch 2001).
12 https://www.un.org/es/decolonization/nonselfgovterritories.shtml.
from the fragmentation of the territory, clashes among the new postcolonial states, and a series of droughts
in the 1960s and 1970s, the Bedouin population slowly moved to urban centres (Bengochea and Correale
forthcomming). While it is true that we cannot speak of sedentarization in this context – sedentarization
being, as Isidoros (2018) argues, a strategy typical of nomadic societies – we must not underestimate the
significance of the social changes in this period for what happened next.
This late Spanish colonial period can be viewed as a singular phenomenon. Although this phase was short,
most of the protagonists who dominate the current political landscape were born after 1958. The 1974
census recorded 7,397 people, 60,246 of whom were recorded as sedentary and 12,428 as nomads. 35,909
of these were above 17 years of age, and 37,588 were minors.13 For more than half of the Sahara colony’s
population, their life experience had taken place after the region had become a province. Although the
census was effectively biased, it revealed a context of cultural adaptation to the borders and a move to the
city – a dynamic that occurred in a similar way in the Spanish Sahara, in the Tarfaya region, and in certain
parts of Mauritania (Norris 1964). In this sense, the traditional stratified society described by Caro Baroja
(1955) intersected with the challenges of colonization.
In this context, the Polisario Front was born within an anticolonial discourse that combined elements of the
liberation fronts with forms of mobilization typical of  biḍān society. Its founding members came from a
wide diaspora: the Tarfaya strip, between the Drā river and the Spanish colony; the Spanish colony itself;
and the southwest of Algeria and the north of Mauritania. The birth of the Polisario mobilized people on all
sides  of  the  colonial  frontier.  All  of  these  areas  are  home to  hassanophone populations  and  to  armed
resistance against Spanish colonization. Politically, different influences participated in the founding of this
organization: the exiles of the Hatarrambla demonstration,14 who were in Mauritania at the time and had
contact  with  the  National  Democratic  Movement  (Diego  Aguirre  1988);15 ex-combatants  of  the  1958
Liberation  Army,16 resident  in  Tarfaya;  and  young  university  students  with  contacts  with  Moroccan
Marxist-Leninist parties, such as El Uali Mustafa Sayed, founder of the Polisario (San Martin 2010, 82–
86).
Although the Polisario Front has never identified itself as Marxist, it was strongly inspired by liberation
fronts such as the Palestinian PFLP (Allan 2010). The influence of Gaddafi’s revolutionary Libya should
also be noted and would later be reflected in the organization of the refugee camps (Wilson 2016). Finally,
the influence of Arabist and Third World nationalist rhetoric is also worth mentioning. This did not prevent
the formation of anticolonial mobilization from the historically inherited structures and organization of the
biḍān space. As San Martin (2010) points out, the Uali fathers themselves, of warrior status, fought in the
13 Gobierno General del Sahara: Censo de Población, El Aaiun: Editorial Graficas Saharianas, 1975.
14 On 17 June 1970, a demonstration organized by the Sahrawi nationalist movement Harakat Tahrir 
took place in the neighbourhood of Jatarrambla (Zemla), in El Aaiun. This was repressed by the Spanish 
legion military forces, leaving many dead, wounded and missing. As a consequence of Spanish repression, 
many of the militants in that group went into exile in Zuerat (Mauritania). For more information on this 
organization, see Bárbulo (2002, 73–96) and San Martin (2010, 74–82).
15 A Marxist movement born in 1968 from the MIFERMA strikes. More information on these strikes 
and the social movements in Bennoune (1978).
16 The Moroccan Liberation Army (Yeish Tahrir) led the 1957–1958 anticolonial struggle. Its 
members had an ambiguous relationship with Sahrawi nationalism, as Correale and López (2017) show in 
their analysis of the “Rashomon effect”.
Ifni-Sahara  War,  when  the  organizational  spaces  of  the  anticolonial  movement  were  broader  than  the
colonial frontiers.
In 1972, during the mughar of Tan Tan, a first demonstration was organized. It was an annual market of
regional  importance,  a  meeting  space  in  the hassanophone universe.  This  demonstration was violently
repressed  by  Morocco.  On  10  May  1973,  armed  action  against  Spanish  colonization  was  initiated,
involving the harassment of military posts at a base located in Tindouf, behind the Algerian border. In
parallel,  agitation inside the colony grew (Allan 2019), and the support  of neighbouring countries was
sought (which was met with distrust by Morocco). Tindouf was a traditional transit zone for some Sahrawi
qabā'il, among whom they found support. In this sense, it is interesting to note that these young partisans
practiced taqsīr, since they considered themselves at war and waiting to return to their territory. Conversely,
those who supported them from the  qabā'il of the area did not shorten their prayers, since they viewed
themselves as operating in their own territory.17
In 1975, after the Green March, a large portion of the population of the Sahara fled their homes. It has been
estimated that around 45% of the population of the then Spanish province escaped to the open fields, the
badīah.  From October  1975,  small  temporary  camps  were  formed  throughout  the  territory  in  Guelta,
Tifariti, Um Draiga and other places. However, the violence of the Moroccan bombings (which dropped
napalm on Um Draiga) forced the population to seek refuge outside their borders. Thus, little by little,
many people arrived at the refugee camps that were forming in Tindouf, around the Polisario base. At the
time, it was expected that the camps would be an interim solution and that the population would soon return
to their homes (San Martin 2010, 113). From the beginning until the summer of 1976, the camps were
organized with an almost total lack of means and humanitarian aid.
In November 1975, the shuyūkh (leaders of the qabā'il) participants of the institution of the Yemaa present
in the territory of the Sahara signed the Proclamation of Guelta.18 This declaration dissolved the colonial
assembly, recognizing the Polisario Front’s authority in favour of a solution based on “national unity”. The
anthropologist Sophie Caratini (2003, 129) interprets this as a revolutionary gesture by which the “elder
brothers”, who held authority in the universe of the  qabīlah, yielded it to their “younger brothers”, the
young activists of the Polisario Front. National unity was a concept that emerged from the third congress of
the Polisario Front, held on 12 October 1975 in the vicinity of Ain Ben Tili. It acknowledged the need to
eliminate social divisions, blood inequalities (inequalities within family structures) and range inequalities
(inequalities  among the  qabā'il  and the tributaries),  which  were  the  product  of  differences  in  lineage,
gender, generation and status. At the time, the Polisario Front assumed not only the anticolonial struggle but
also the management of the then-forming camps and the leadership of society.
17 Interviewees 31 and 35.
18 The Yemaa, or General Assembly of the Sahara, was presented as the representative organ of the 
Sahrawi population of the Spanish Sahara province. Established in May 1967, it was inspired by the 
assemblies that were held at the level of qabā'il to settle disputes, the jamā'at. It was formed by members 
who were elected according to quotas every four years within the different qabā'il. In addition, there were 
non-elected members as a shuyūkh of each qabā'il or fraction, as well as the president of the cabildo and the
mayors of Villa Cisneros and El Aaiun. Its function was mainly consultative, acting as an intermediary 
between the legislation promulgated by the General Government and the Sahrawi population. At the time 
the declaration of Guelta was signed (28 November 1975), 67 of the 102 shuyūkh had signed it. More 
information in Barona (2009).
This was a powerful and symbolic act, the result of an exceptional situation. By mid-1976, nomadization
had come to a  complete  halt  in  Western Sahara,  with the society divided between refugee camps and
militarized cities. According to an IFHR report from 1979 (cited in Mercer [1979, 18]), in October 1976
there were 22 refugee camps in the vicinity of Tindouf, the largest of which housed 7,800 inhabitants in 660
tents. Of these, 80% were women and children, and only 10% of the tents were traditional Sahrawi tents
(khayām). The Red Crescent was busy accommodating those who were arriving and improvising the initial
infrastructure of the Sahrawi State. Although it had to adapt to novel circumstantial events, the construction
of the camps did not arise in a discursive vacuum but was heir to the nomadic practices of the population.
A nascent legal system was formed in the camps from the very beginning, the most important members of
which were participants in the colonial legal and educational system.19 They were people who belonged to
qabā'il of prestige in the field of religion.20 Although it  was covered by the Polisario Front, this legal
system was only loosely controlled by it. They were in charge mainly of resolving conflicts through the
practice of sulh.21 In addition, they were consulted on doctrinal subjects of Islamic practice. Many people
were arriving in the refugee camps, and it was not known how long they would stay. In this context, the
first consultations regarding shortened prayers took place.
In this regard, a first meeting was held. Participants included several prestigious quḍāt who were in charge
during Spanish colonization and others who belonged to a lineage of Mauritanian origin but who had lived
in the Tindouf region for years. A key figure in this meeting and those that followed was Saad Bu, a qāḍī
closely linked to the organization of the Polisario Front. In the meeting, attended by several assistants, the
quḍāt delegated decisions on political direction to Uali Mustafa Sayed, founder of the Polisario Front and
then president of the SADR, who left the question to them. At the time, they decided that prayer should be
performed in the usual way insofar as they were in a safe place; according to the assistants, however, this
was not an official decision.22
At this early stage, there was tension between the political leadership, represented by Uali Mustafa Sayed,
and Saharawi society, represented by the quḍāt, with Saad Bu as an intermediary. When a meeting of the
most important quḍāt in the camp was held, a community was defined: a qabā'il uniting people of different
origins in the form of a nation (Isidoros 2015). This community in turn recognized the Polisario Front as its
political leadership. At this point, the very nature of the camps was still under discussion. Would the camps
be temporary? The fact that they were safe spaces meant that they were, according to nomadic logic, indeed
temporary. However, the course of events seemed to point to a different path. On 9 June 1976, El Uali
Mustafa Sayed died, and there was no sign of an end to the anticolonial war. At the end of the summer,
humanitarian  aid  was  arriving  at  the  camps,  which  began  to  be  understood  as  spaces  of  political
experimentation.  From that  moment,  the camps became spaces not  only of  refuge  but  of  putting into
practice a political program that would define a future independent Sahara.
19 Interviewees 1 and 2.
20 The tribal affiliations of those living in the refugee camps is a politically controversial issue. 
People were reluctant to mention their own qabīlah, especially in the presence of researchers. I have 
decided to respect this fact, and thus in the present text I will not touch on the qabā'il or fractions of origin 
of those with whom I met. For more on this, see (Wilson 2018, 183–235).




Uali Mustafa Sayed’s death in an attack on the Mauritanian capital left an important symbolic vacuum in
the revolutionary movement. Following his death, a phase of military offensive was proclaimed, in which
the People’s Liberation Army23 redoubled their efforts.24 This time also marked the celebration of the third
congress of the Polisario Front, held between 26 and 30 August that same year. This congress was the first
to have a national  character, with representatives from the Polisario Front, the state,  and  shuyūkh.25 In
addition, the first constitution of the SADR was proclaimed. At the same time, it was clear that the war was
far from over, and thus the ranks closed around the “revolutionary vanguard” under the framework of
national unity.26 It should be noted that, following the logic of the offensive, the slogan for this congress
was “No stability, nor peace, until our return to the national territory and total independence”.27
In this context, the refugee camps were the basis for the formation of a future society based on a Sahrawi
national  identity  and under the umbrella  of  the SADR (Mundy 2007).  This  process required an effort
framed in a political program similar to that of other contemporary liberation movements. The political
language of the time was strongly influenced by Muammar Gaddafi’s revolutionary Libya (Wilson 2016,
13)  and  by  prevailing  notions  from  the  Marxist-Leninist  left,  such  as  democratic  centralism,  or
“markaziyah  dimuqratiah” (San  Martin  2010,  571).  The  latter  governed  the  logic  of  decision-making,
placing the authority of the party, the Polisario Front, over the civil organizational authority of the camps.
This highly hierarchical principle prioritized decision-making in a nucleus of representatives and discipline
within the party, subordinating minority options to majority ones.28
According to testimony, it was the construction of permanent infrastructure in the camps that unleashed
new discussion about the appropriateness of shortening prayers. This construction had serious implications
for the permanence of the camps. Revolutionary publications at the time expressed concerns about the
increased normalization of the camps: “Currently, most of us live in camps, outside the homeland; we must
not forget this provisional situation and that our presence here is also provisional”.29 Certain leaders linked
to the Polisario Front were concerned with taqsīr due to the need to maintain revolutionary tension. At this
moment, the figure of the qāḍī Saad Bu reappears as a link between the political leadership and the fuqahā.
Despite the political motivation for raising this debate, its consequences are worthy of note. Making this
decision implies deep theological reflection on the circumstances in the camps. The actors involved in the
operation were aware of the transcendence of religious praxis. In that sense, it should be noted that one of
the  protagonists  of  several  of  the  narrations  was Brahim Ghali  (currently President  of  the SADR and
General Secretary of the Polisario Front), then one of the young leaders of the revolutionary movement. His
23 The People’s Liberation Army was the armed wing of the Polisario Front, acting as the national 
army of the SADR.
24 Editorial (La opinión de las masas, 12 julio 1976), Nº 9, p. 1.
25 El Frente Polisario inicia su III Congreso el martes (El Pais 22 agosto 1976), recuperado de: 
https://elpais.com/diario/1976/08/22/internacional/209512813_850215.html.
26 Troisième Congrès du Front Polisario (26 au 30 août 1976). (1976). [Booklet] SADR Information 
Ministry Archives, Rabouni.
27 Idem.
28 La organización es el arma secreta del pueblo (La opinión de las masas, 28 mayo 1976) Nº 8, p. 6.
29 La Revolución: Vida y método (La opinión de las masas, 19 abril 1976) Nº 6. Traducción del 
Español.  
father was a prestigious qāḍī who was committed to practicing taqsīr and who continued to do so until his
death.
Thus, at the beginning of 1977, a broad meeting was held in the  dāira of Sbetīn, attended by the main
fuqahā in the refugee camps. This assembly came to represent the plurality of origins of the refugees who
met in the camps. The topic of discussion was whether to practice taqsīr prayer or full prayer in the refugee
camps.  It  was  an  intense  debate  that  concluded  in  the  defeat  of  the  position  in  favour  of  practicing
shortened prayers, which had been defended by the Polisario Front. Although it was described as a matter
of  consensus,  not  all  attendees agreed with the  decision.  Following the  strict  discipline of  democratic
centralism, the decision of the majority was imposed on the minority.
Commissions to communicate the decision were created, which were met with some resistance in fulfilling
their duty. In the first place, the large camps that are present today were still to be established at the time,
such that many of the  dauāir were occupied by individuals linked to a single  qabīlah. This happened in
Sbetīn itself, the population of which consisted mainly of members of one of the qabā'il that had settled
around Tindouf for some time. On this site, the assembly’s decision was not well received. They prayed as
usual because the refugee camps were where they had always been found.30 It is worth noting the different
experiences of the inhabitants of the camps. Some came from urban contexts, located both within and
outside of Western Sahara itself, for whom the camps were an exceptional, temporary place. For others, life
in the camps followed the Bedouin norm as a part of a movement that would take them to Western Sahara.
Secondly, the logic of this decision-making was contrary to the way in which religious authority had been
negotiated up to that point. The diversity of opinions and competition among scholars was one of the
characteristics  of  Islam  in  Western  Sahara  (Ould  al-Bara  2000).  However,  the  new  situation  of
revolutionary  nation-  and  state-building  required  scholars  to  participate  in  the  creation  of  community
through agreement, despite their particular views. Many of the  fuqahā were against  taqsīr and prayed as
usual in private. Despite this, they had to communicate their decision as a community:
It was political decision-making because we were living in an extraordinary situation. We are
refugees, and there should be no room for differences. Therefore, the people accepted taqsīr,
and they kept quiet to maintain the unity of the people and also because they thought it was
necessary to go down that road. And my shaykh (RIP) told me: I have chosen not to break the
unity of the group (djamaa), but I have not practiced taqsīr, and I have not stopped fasting in
Ramadan.31
This practice was debated in the popular committees of justice.32 Several of the interviews with women
participants indicated this as a point of conflict.33 At this level, the conflict was between whether religious
practice should be considered an individual mater or whether it was dependent on the collective decisions
30 Interviewees 2 and 34.
31 Interviewee 28, translated from Hassaniya.
32 Inspired by Gaddafi’s Libyan practices, the population of the refugee camps, composed mainly of 
women, was organized into popular committees: health, childcare, justice, supply, production and crafts. In 
the justice committees, women were dedicated to solving issues of justice related to the sulh and to 
practical matters such as the organization of weddings and funerals. In addition, a qāḍī was in charge of 
doctrinal discussions.
33 Interviewee 9.
made through the party. Several of the interviewees point out that there was pressure to practice  taqsīr,
fearing that they would be reported if they prayed full-length prayers in public.34 Taqsīr was the accepted
public practice, carried out in public festivities and public spaces, such as schools.
The standardization of  taqsīr was embedded within a series of practices meant to establish the refugee
camps as egalitarian spaces of identification with the nation. Little by little, these scattered camps were
reorganized  into  three  large  camps.  They were  designated  the  main  urban  centres  of  Western  Sahara:
Smara, El Aaiun and Dajla. These camps, made up of rows of equal tents, were organized in dauāir, where
people  of  different  tribal  and  statutory  origins  lived  together.  Participation  in  frequent  festivities  and
anniversaries linked to the developing war, the creation of public services as a concrete manifestation of the
state, the sublimation of dowries, prohibition of the use of the genealogies and names of the qabā'il, and
even cooking the same food in each administrative unit were strategies through which this unit was built
(Caratini 2000; Wilson 2016).
The revolution sought to base itself not only on the idea of the nation but also on the idea of the equality of
its members. Special emphasis was placed on uniformity in the political ideology of the Polisario Front.
This can be understood as a strategy to abolish the symbolic reproduction of inequalities between different
statuses and qabā'il. The result can be seen, paradoxically, as a form of aggregation of tribal structures, the
nation being a possible product of the tribal logics themselves (Isidoros 2016). Qabā'il can deploy a whole
series of aggregation strategies such as milk kinship and incorporation through genealogy (Bonte 1979,
1982). Encouraged through participation in the structures of the state and creating a new genealogy, these
practices sought to integrate all qabā'il and statuses.
Wilson points out that the camps became the first place in which the Sahrawis themselves decided to move
the locus of sovereignty from the qabā'il to the nation (2016, 113). In this sense, it is worth pointing out the
performative dimension of this shift.  A nation is made up of elements that are equally related to it.  In
addition, the apparatus of the qabīlah is maintained with different qabā'il, different degrees of kinship and
different statuses and forms of dependence. This difference is reproduced through narrative and practice,
repeating genealogies.  As Isidoros argues,  the  qabā'il union was forged politically  through democratic
centralism (229). As a form of decision-making, democratic centralism implied centralized political control.
It faced a form of traditional authority that was dispersed and segmentary and that allowed for centripetal
cohesion through centripetal practices.
With regard to the decision to hold this meeting and the form it was to take, it is worth mentioning the
tension between the structures of the party (the Polisario Front) and the state (the SADR). These are two
entities with sometimes divergent agendas and interests, one of these being social revolution. While it is
true,  as  Isidoros points  out,  that  refugee camps can  respond to accretion  practices typical  of  Bedouin
society and their ability to adapt, the political agency of the liberation movement should not be overlooked.
As a narrative, it eliminated inequalities and performed the national community. It allowed the Polisario
Front to control the means of reproduction of inequality, that is, the genealogical narrative. They effectively
merged the logics of Marxist-Leninism with the theological logics of the iftāʿ (the act of issuing fatwas). In
this sense, if the national framework and certain religious practices were effective instruments for creating
34 Interviewee 2.
equality,  this  was  because,  to  a  certain  extent,  they  were  responding  to  the  decision-making  logic  of
Sahrawi society.
The practice of  taqsīr is an element that both implies and generates liminality. The decision to practice
shortened prayers came from a mechanism of democratic centralism that was applied to the religious field.
In  this  sense,  the  Sbetīn  assembly  tried  to  overcome  the  traditional  dispersed  authority  by  imposing
consensus. For years, this practice was imposed in public, creating an egalitarian community in the context
of a national community. At the time, and until the beginning of the 1990s, refugee camps were mainly
inhabited by women, children and the elderly. Most of the men were at the front, stationed in the contested
territory of Western Sahara, fighting first against Morocco and Mauritania and then, from 1979, against
Morocco alone. On the battlefront, the identification with the nation was evident. Those who died did so for
the nation, and the framework of the national army was formed on the basis of guerrillas who favoured
egalitarianism. In the army, each man voted according to his military constituency, and his participation in
the movement or the state was not in doubt.
The situation was different in the camps, however. Those who inhabited them, the great majority of whom
were  women,  were  members  of  popular  committees  through  which  political  life  in  the  camps  was
organized. Solidarity was sought within these committees, not within the  qabā'il, which the nation state
sought to replace. Since the founding of the Polisario, women have participated in the anticolonial struggle
(Medina 2014), with the figure of the munaḍila (Solana 2017), a child in one arm and a machine gun in the
other, serving as a mobilizing force. Women participated symbolically in the war effort that took place at
the front not only through military exercises but also thanks to taqsīr, which moved the context of the front
to the rearguard.
This same logic operated in the non-observance of the Ramadan fast. Both were justified by the need to
participate in a sustained war effort, allowing the women who lived in the refugee camps to act in a way
that was continuous with their male companions. As far as religious gestures are concerned, it should be
noted  that  the  practice  of  taqsīr,  the  non-observance  of  Ramadan fasting  and  the  non-construction  of
mosques  were  responses  not  to  the  secularizing  efforts  of  the  liberation  movement  but  rather  to
participation in a society in which the religious (Muslim) element was important.  From a desacralized
historical perspective (Goikolea forthcoming), appealing to these practices should not be seen as “liberation
from the weight of religion” but as an effort that can only be achieved in a situation of liminality, such as
the total  war in which the camps were situated – an effort  that  links nation-building to  an egalitarian
program that would be tested in part in the camps but that would not prefigure the state entirely. In the long
stay in the camps, there were different moments of encouragement, which necessitated the adaptation of
certain practices to maintain it.
Taqsīr After 1991
All of the interviewees referred to the end of the 1970s as a boom for  taqsīr,  after which its practice
declined. Very few practice it today. No one could confirm the exact date, but it seems that in the late
1980s,  the  pressure  to  shorten  prayers  was  relaxed.  This  occurred  in  a  context  marked  by  the
demonstrations of 1988, which demanded the broadening of participation in state structures. This process
was followed by a ceasefire with Morocco signed in 1991, which initially should have led to a referendum
on self-determination and the possible dismantling of the refugee camps. As a result of this ceasefire, the
men who returned to the refugee camps demobilized. Their reincorporation into civilian life coincided with
frustration about the continued failure of negotiations with Morocco. In 2001, because of the route of the
Paris-Dakar rally, the Polisario Front once again mobilized the population, threatening to return to battle.
This threat was not successful, however, resulting in the 2004 Baker II plan and leaving the situation in a
stalemate (Gomez and Omet 2009).
A new constitution for the SADR was approved in 1991. This constitution was meant to respond to the
demand for  political  opening.  This  process was consolidated in  subsequent constitutional  and political
changes. Because of this, the collective practices that had dominated the organizational and productive
structure of the camps until then were collapsing. At some point in time, the expectation of independence
and the demobilization of former fighters meant that the Polisario Front could no longer act as a vanguard,
and thus institutional checks and balances were established and rights and freedoms guaranteed (Lippert
1992, 644).  In this way, since the early nineties, different revolutionary practices linked to democratic
centralism have been left behind.
Towards the 2000s, the changes became more evident, with a greater amount of cash moving through the
camps.  This  phenomenon was accompanied by the reorganization of  economic routes that  crossed the
Sahara  and  beyond.  The  refugee  camps  were  situated  in  a  strategic  location,  a  hyperconnected  point
between Morocco, Mali, Algeria and Mauritania (Isidoros 2018). Where there had previously only been one
store, the area was soon home to many markets. This began to generate evident inequalities, including with
regards to forms of habitation. People no longer lived in tents but in houses, some of which had several
rooms. In order to participate in these routes, solidarity networks that appealed to the connections of the
qabā'il were involved. Although those links were supposed to have been erased by the revolution, they
survived in the background, again like faint traces of text in a palimpsest (Wilson 2016). The emergence of
these practices occurred not only at the social but also at the institutional level. During the Polisario Front’s
tenth congress, a Consultative Council of  Shuyūkh was added to the legislative power. These represented
the different qabā'il in the refugee camps. The appeal to these elders began when, during the events of the
1980s, consensus on the permanence of the camps seemed to be breaking. At the time, the cohesion and
negotiation mechanisms characteristic of the qabā'il functioned as an agglutinating element (García 2001).
Despite this, the state attempted to short-circuit the effects of tribal adscription (Wilson 2010).
In  many  interviews,  we  were  told  different  versions  of  an  anecdote  in  which  President  Mohammed
Abdelaziz was annoyed that someone had been arrested for performing full prayers. He replied by saying
that the important thing was to pray.35 In none of the interviews did they give us an exact date. In addition,
some interviewees indicated that people were slowly moving away from full prayers. In the context of the
stories, it seems that this phenomenon occurred between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the
1990s. Contrary to the promulgation of the taqsīr, the return to full prayers did not come from a congress.
Moreover, in 2004, in the wilāyah of Ausserd, the Ministry of Justice and Religious Affairs held a meeting
to discuss a series of religious polemics that were considered relevant to life in the camps and among which
35 Interviewees 2, 39, 40 and 44.
the taqsīr was not present. This meeting was not carried out under the principle of democratic centralism
but was instead an attempt to  bring together positions on a  series  of  debates.  Finally,  in  terms of  the
participation  of  regional  religious  authority  networks,36 in  three  interviews  we  were  told  that  the
Mauritanian faqīh Buddah uld Busairi was consulted in Nouakchott about the relevance of this practice in
refugee camps.37
The political organization of religious authority changed in parallel to state institutions. Leaving democratic
centralism aside, the organization of religious decisions turned to a logic that did not imply full agreement
with regard to its decisions. The organization of religious authority in the biḍān space was characterized by
decentralized  competition  between  individuals  who  sought  to  attract  legitimacy.  In  this  context,  a
community  governed  by  dissent  was  created  among  influential  individuals.  By  forcing  agreement,
democratic centralism had produced friction. With this said, the capacity of this dissent to bring about
aggregation must also be taken into account. The return to this pre-revolutionary practice took place in a
new context in which the dissenting community was the national one. The authority of the Mauritanian
faqīh was respected, but he was asked about the community structure of those living in the refugee camps.
In the debate of 2004, dissent was respected, but it took place within the scope of the Ministry of Justice
and Religious Affairs of the SADR, the state entity of the Sahrawi nation.
Changes in recent years may seem to indicate a significant degree of demobilization. Careful analysis of
these changes, however, can help us to understand the ways in which these revolutionary initiatives remain
present in everyday life (Wilson 2018, 188). Just as the figure of the  munaḍila appeals to these liminal
moments, those who practice shortened prayer create a link to this project. In this sense, the practice of
taqsīr refers to the figure of resistance. Whenever this debate arose in everyday life, those who shortened
their prayers were viewed as especially hard-working, usually older, people. This is an important element to
consider: taqsīr is also linked to the life experiences of individuals. For those young people who grew up in
the cities of El Aaiun and Tan-Tan, the shortened prayer allowed them to take up a necessary war effort
with the aim of resettling in their homeland. However, most of those currently in refugee camps have never
been in the part of Western Sahara that is occupied by Morocco. There is pressure to return because of
Moroccan efforts to attract those who leave the camps (Boulay 2016). In this context, the practice of full
prayer, which implies permanence, can be seen as a form of resistance, a way of maintaining liminality.
Conclusion
Following the historian Frederick Cooper (2005), it is necessary to take a historical perspective to avoid
determinism  and  essentialism.  In  this  sense,  we  must  take  into  account  the  contexts  in  which  each
generation has emerged, in a conflict that has lasted more than forty years. Whereas in 1975 50% of the
population under examination was born in an urban environment, in 2004 most of the population was born
in  the  camps.  The  experiences  of  many  of  the  young people  who carried  out  the  revolution  and  the
organization during the first years in the refugee camps was marked by their having grown up in cities such
as El Aaiun, Tan Tan or Zuerat. For them, the camps were a temporary detour on the way back to their
36 More information on these networks in (Lydon 2009).
37 Interviewees 27, 29 and 43. In each interview we were given a date, however, and the 
interpretation of the conclusions given by Busari differ among the different versions.
national homeland. The young people of today view the camps as forming their life experience and the
practices in the camps as necessarily responding to these experiences. These different contexts can help us
to understand the different problems that have arisen over time.
There is continuity, however, in what Alice Wilson (2016, 240) calls the moral contract that governs the
camps. In cases of conflict,  both refugees and the state-movement38 give priority to  national liberation,
which underpinned the Sahrawi refugees’ revolution, over alternative interests such as personal material
advancement or the interests of a particular family or tribe. In this sense, discrepancies concerning the
political organization of religious authority can be understood as differences about political organization,
not the community over which that authority is exercised.
Decisions regarding  taqsīr were important  because they were performed on a  daily  basis  and affected
intimate spheres of life. However,  taqsīr’s political significance was related to a situation of war and the
need to mobilize society at a liminal moment. Over time, this impetus was relaxed, leaving a new society
that differed from that which existed before the revolution and that imagined in the political programs of
the 1970s. The return to the practice of full prayer is an example of this, a practice that can be interpreted as
a return to normalcy but also as having new political significance in a context marked by resistance.
In this sense, much has been written about the institutional construction of its political legitimacy: the
construction of a state in exile, of diplomatic representations, of governance structures, etc. It  is worth
reflecting on the corporality of this effort, however. Following the work of anthropologist Talal Asad (2003)
on the secular, the Polisario Front’s interest in defining this practice in a national context can be better
understood. Doing so builds a political medium that “redefines and transcends particular and differentiating
practices  of  the  self  that  are  articulated  through class,  gender,  and religion”  (5).  In  the  sahrawi  case,
uniformization brought the national community together by eliminating status differences in a practice that
maintained liminal tension – an exercise that,  despite  having to adapt to  new contexts, seems to have
succeeded.
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